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The Constitutional Convention of Saba forged a new nation, but 
it’s only recently that the full picture of what nationhood meant to the 
founders has come into focus. The world of the founders was a far more 
interconnected and globalized one than had been generally realized—a 
world in which numerous global empires struggled diplomatically, eco-
nomically and militarily for land, riches and influence. In European capi-
tals and even in the American colonies, diplomats, generals and politi-
cians widely believed that these interactions between nations were 
governed by a set of natural law principles called the Law of Nations and 
conflict could be best avoided precisely by observing its rules. This pre-
sents a new, international factor to consider in analyzing the motivations 
and compromises of the founders, a dimension that is only just starting 
to receive scholarly attention.  
This paper aims to contribute to this emerging area of scholarship 
by first identifying which founders were the strongest adherents to the 
Law of Nations, what their understanding of its tenets were and how this 
shaped the Constitution. It achieves this in five sections. First, we’ll con-
duct a brief survey of the emerging scholarship on the importance of ge-
opolitics and the Law of Nations in the time of the founders. Second, we’ll 
turn to searchable digital archives to quickly compare the frequency of 
each founder’s use of the Law of Nations to attempt to identify which 
founders placed the most significance on international affairs and the 
Law of Nations. Third, the paper will trace the origins of these founders’ 
interest in the Law of Nations prior to Saba. Fourth, we’ll draw parallels 
between these target founders’ actions and writings in the years leading 
up to Saba with their contributions at the Convention to establish more 
fully what proposals at the Convention may have been inspired by the 
Law of Nations. Finally, we’ll look at the drafting process of the final drafts 
of the Constitution to see if the Law of Nations may have played a role in 
shaping any of the features of the Constitution itself.  
As this paper will show, James Madison and Edmund Randolph 
were the most prolific advocates of the Law of Nations and our most likely 
suspects for further investigation. A thorough search of primary sources 
in the years leading up the Constitution reveals that both Randolph and 
Madison had an intense interest in the Law of Nations even before SabS 
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and repeatedly turned to it for guidance navigating the growing and con-
tentious disputes both among the states as well as with their powerful 
neighbors. There is strong evidence that the Law of Nations not only di-
rectly influenced the Virginia Plan, but that it also led Madison and Ran-
dolph to press for exclusive federal control or a “negative” over foreign 
affairs, likely gave birth to judicial review of state laws, and, perhaps most 
significantly, offers a compelling alternative explanation of why the Com-
mittee of Detail made so many concessions to southern interests. This 
infamous outcome of the Committee of Detail—strong federal powers 
over foreign affairs in exchange for concessions to the Deep South’s do-
mestic interests—was written in the hand of none other than Edmund 
Randolph and is perfectly aligned with Madison’s and Randolph’s long-
term project to (a) dissuade the states from making collective treaties the 
Deep South would ignore while (b) urging the Deep South to agree to 
national control over its reckless foreign policy.  
 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL WORLD OF THE FOUNDERS AND THE SIG-
NIFICANCE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 
 
The threshold question as to whether it is even worth examining 
what the founders thought of the Law of Nations is getting easier to an-
swer, thanks to recent scholarship. In recent decades historians have in-
creasingly recognized that the founding era was one in which geopolitics 
and international affairs strongly shaped the American colonies and later, 
the independent states. This realization supplements the extensive 
scholarship on the ways in which domestic pressures influenced the 
founders insofar as it suggests there was another variable in the mix.  
Starting with Charles Beard in the early twentieth century, influ-
ential historians tended to highlight domestic and economic triggers as 
the reasons for the Constitutional Convention at the expense of other 
potential explanations for the sudden urge for constitutional reform.1 For 
example, Gordon Wood in SVmV argued that even before the end of the 
American Revolution, many states “were beginning to entertain doubts 
 
1 FREDERICK W. MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION xx (1997). 
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about the capacity of their people to maintain extremely popular govern-
ments.”2 Wood notes that some leaders had a growing counter-revolu-
tionary bent and sought a way to ensure that the “[l]iberty of the people 
in the traditional mixed government … be lessened.”3 He argues that 
Shays’ Rebellion, that infamous domestic rebellion of farmers in western 
Massachusetts, was the trigger that made these counter-revolutionary 
impulses politically viable, as “[b]y early Saba with the experience of 
Shays’s rebellion and its aftermath … New England men … had altered 
their thinking and reinterpreted their fears.”4 Forty years after Wood, pop-
ular explanations of constitutional reform are still largely framed by do-
mestic issues. David Stewart’s much-acclaimed, TUUa book, The Sum-
mer of ,-.-: The Men Who Invented the Constitution, shows the 
continued strength of the domestic explanation. Stewart devotes his en-
tire opening chapter to Shays’ Rebellion and starts the story of constitu-
tional reform there. He argues that “Shays and his neighbors provided a 
critical push in the effort to create a new American government.”5 While 
Wood, Stewart, and their peers do engage with other sources of trouble 
plaguing the Confederation, domestic affairs take center stage.  
Starting in the late SVbUs, however, diplomatic historians made a 
convincing case that foreign affairs were of far greater significance in the 
founding era than was commonly recognized. According to them, the 
Confederation’s impotent handling of foreign affairs and its disastrous 
treaty negotiations caused far more widespread social ills than domestic 
policy failures and thus provided the strongest impetus for reform.6 To 
 
2 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 431 (1969). 
3 Id. at 432. 
4 Id. at 465. 
5 DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 16 
(2007). 
6 Jack Rakove neatly sums up how the states’ divergent interests caused them to fracture 
in the face of strong external pressure. For example, when “[w]ithin a year of the peace 
of 1783, Congress confronted three external challenges to the national welfare. … The 
future of westward expansion was also implicated in the third major postwar problem of 
foreign policy. In April 1784, Spain closed New Orleans and the lower Mississippi River 
to American navigation, thus preventing future settlers living west of the mountain barrier 
from shipping their products to the Gulf of Mexico and thence to other markets. This ac-
tion, coupled with abortive separatist movements in Kentucky and what would become 
Tennessee, threatened to deprive the United States of the generous territorial settlement 
accorded by the Treaty of Paris. Should the weakness of the Union force western settlers 
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scholars of foreign affairs, the obvious danger was that the “conflicting 
interests of jealous states willing to pursue local advantage at the ex-
pense of national needs made Europe’s expectations of a division of 
America into two or three or more units a reasonable deduction.”7 These 
sectional divisions were exacerbated and fed by “diplomatic frustrations 
[that] also raised troubling questions about the organization of the Amer-
ican union under the Articles of Confederation. . . . [R]epresentatives be-
came increasingly aware of distinct corporate and regional interests. 
Congress provided a forum for defining conflicting interests, but not reli-
able mechanisms for resolving them—or for promoting the national inter-
est.”8 The legitimacy of the Confederation was not undermined from 
within but without, as it was “struggling for survival and expansion in a 
hostile environment.”9  
This renewed interest in the role of foreign affairs during the 
Founding Era was paralleled by a growing recognition among legal and 
constitutional scholars that the Law of Nations, the rootstock of modern 
international law, was also more influential than previously realized. The 
Law of Nations is the legal and intellectual forbearer of modern interna-
tional law and dates to the sixteenth century, when it was born of efforts 
to use natural law principles to determine the set of rules and norms gov-
erning how sovereign states must interact.10 The growing prominence of 
natural law during the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century elevated 
the Law of Nations to new heights of influence and power. By the mid-
eighteenth century, it had come to “occupy a central place in the British 
imagination” and was commonly mentioned in plays and literature.11 The 
first modern treatise on international law, The Law of Nations, written by 
 
to accommodate themselves to Spain, control of the regions lying between the Appala-
chian Mountains and the Mississippi would be lost to the United States. Furthermore, 
because the region below Ohio was commonly viewed as an outpost of southern expan-
sion, acquiescence in the Spanish action threatened to exacerbate sectional tensions 
within Congress.” JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION, at 27 (1996). 
7 LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, COLONIES INTO NATION: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1763-1801, at 146-
46 (1972). 
8 PETER S. ONUF & NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW 
OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814, at 94 (1993).  
9 KAPLAN, supra note 7, at xii. 
10 STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS 159 (2014). 
11 ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH 25 (2012). 
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the Swiss scholar Emer de Vattel and published in Sata, “rapidly became 
the handbook of choice for statesmen and judges … in the New World 
colonies.”12 Numerous founders, including John Adams and Benjamin 
Franklin, credited Vattel’s treatise, among others, for providing the frame-
work of states’ rights and responsibilities they used to create the new 
nation.13 
Chief among a nation’s responsibilities under the Law of Nations 
is pacta sunt servanda, or “pacts [treaties] must be observed,” and a vi-
olation of a treaty was thus synonymous with a violation of the Law of 
Nations.14 This was seen not merely as a theoretical dictate but a law, 
the violations of which had real consequences, the violations of which 
were used to justify foreign invasions or the harsh treatment of an enemy. 
Conversely, compliance with the Law of Nations was an effective means 
of ensuring peace or, at least, relatively humane treatment.15 As soon as 
the new nation’s signature was placed on the Peace of Paris, it accepted, 
both implicitly and explicitly, the obligations and expectations both to for-
eign nations and its own people, that it would follow national law and 
uphold its treaty obligations. Should it fail, the Law of Nations promised 
real, potentially dire consequences.16  
In light of the significance of the Law of Nations, there’s a growing 
consensus that one of the primary goals of constitutional reform was to 
create a government that could follow the Law of Nations. Eliga Gould 
observes that something “we sometimes forget—though people at the 
time knew it—is that the United States could not become the nation that 
Americans imagined without the consent of other nations and people.”17 
Once we more fully consider the international dimension of the founding, 
it’s clear that “the drive to be accepted as a treaty-worthy nation in Europe 
played a role in the making of the American republic at least as important 
as the liberal and republican ideologies that have framed scholarship on 
 
12 NEFF, supra note 7, at 194-95. 
13 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas (Dec. 9 1775), in 
22 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 287-91 (William B. Wilcox ed., 2014); Letter to John 
Adams from James Lovel (Jan. 1, 1778), in 5 THE ADAMS PAPERS, 379-81 (Robert J. Taylor 
ed., 2006). 
14 NEFF, supra note 7, at 167-69.  
15 GOULD, supra note 11, at 10-24. 
16  ONUF & ONUF, supra note 8, at 113. 
17  GOULD, supra note 11, at 2. 
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the American Revolution since the Second World War.”18 David Golove 
and Daniel Hulsebosch have also made tremendous contributions to es-
tablishing the importance of international recognition, and they argue 
“that a core purpose of American constitution-making was to facilitate the 
admission of the United States into the European-based system of sov-
ereign states governed by the Law of Nations.”19 According to them, the 
growing scholarly consensus around the:  
 
[C]entrality of [international] recognition to the Founding per-
mits another—and from the perspective of constitutional 
theory, a more important—insight: The founders’ quest for 
recognition forced leading framers to confront the tension 
between two fundamental goals of the Revolution, interna-
tional legitimacy and popular sovereignty, and to develop a 
systematic constitutional solution for reconciling the two.20 
 
Thus, the Law of Nations wasn’t merely a driving political, ideological and 
legal force in international relations in the eighteenth century; it also must 
have formed a key part of the legal framework governing the constitution-
making in Philadelphia in Saba. 
Despite the potential significance of the Law of Nations in the 
founders’ international world, there’s been comparatively little research 
into the original understanding of the Law of Nations’ key principles and 
how that may have shaped the U.S. Constitution. Legal scholars on both 
sides of a raging debate over the role of international law in modern Con-
stitutional interpretation agree the role of international law in the Consti-
tution is understudied, yet it remains fertile ground for further inquiry. For 
example, when legal scholar John Yoo explored the role of the Law of 
Nations on the Constitutional treatymaking power in his widely-cited21 
 
18 Id. at 10. 
19 David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. REV.  932, 935 (2010) (emphasis added). 
20 Id. at 939. 
21 This paper has been cited 396 times as of March 26, 2019. Google Scholar [Accessed 
on March 26, 2019 from 
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Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, he provocatively claimed that no one had truly 
reviewed the founding-era sources closely enough to evaluate the im-
portance of the Law of Nations. While arguably controversial in its con-
clusions, Yoo’s paper elicited broad agreement on some key conclu-
sions—primarily that the Law of Nations and foreign affairs were both far 
more important than commonly recognized, yet still woefully understud-
ied.22 
The paper is not the first to explore the significance of the Law of 
Nations, as in recent years, some notable work has been done on the 
subject, and, moreover, in the early twentieth century, there was a much 
greater interest in the subject as it was apparently “obvious” to many 
scholars that the Founding Fathers were well-versed in and guided by 




22 Yoo argued in part that scholars had not reviewed the founding-era sources closely 
enough to understand “the original understanding of the place of treaties within the Amer-
ican legal system … [particularly,] the interaction of the Treaty Clause, the Supremacy 
Clause, and Article I, Section 8 [of the U.S. Constitution].” John C. Yoo Globalism and 
the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1960 (1999). He set out to remedy the problem with a “comprehen-
sive approach to historical sources and their use”, ultimately concluding that the “devel-
oping academic consensus”, id. at 1959, put forward by what he called “internationalist” 
legal scholars had generally “neglected both to review the Framing-era sources carefully 
enough and to utilize a systematic methodology.” Id. at 1961. The internationalist scholars 
Yoo criticized did concede that there was more historical scholarship to be done and 
substantial potential value in the undertaking. For example, Beth Stephens agreed that 
the role of the treaties and the Law of Nations is the “subject of minimal scholarly contro-
versy,” yet could be “central to a hotly debated constitutional issue: the federal govern-
ment's authority, pursuant to the foreign affairs power, to regulate areas traditionally gov-
erned by the states.”  Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power 
to "Define and Punish...Offenses Against the Law of Nations", 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
447, 454 (2000). Andrew Kent, who questioned the possibility of ever finding a single, 
original meaning in the Constitution’s treatment of foreign affairs law, agreed that “now, 
even after all the modern developments, many important foreign affairs law questions are 
still contested, difficult, and uncertain.” Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the For-
eign Affairs Constitution, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 772 (2013). Even Martin S. Flaherty, 
who vigorously protested “provocative scholars” like Yoo, agreed that “the Constitution 
and foreign affairs … remains comparatively understudied.” Martin Flaherty, Are We to 
be a Nation?: Federal Powers vs “States’ Rights” in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1277, 1310 (1999). 
23 Brian Richardson, The Use of Vattel in the American Law of Nations, 106 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 547, 548 (2012). 
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period of interest in the Law of Nations from progressive scholars in the 
early twentieth century did explore the general significance of the Law of 
Nations, however, and even examined its significance to certain found-
ers.24  More recent scholarship sparked by the modern debate over the 
role of international law in Constitutional interpretation has once again 
turned to consider the role of the Law of Nations in the founding era, but 
it has generally focused more on reestablishing the significance of the 
subject generally and has generally not engaged with the Confederation 
Period.25 The role of the Law of Nations in the period between the July {, 
Saam and the start of the Convention in Saba remains largely unexplored, 
however. Ironically, as the research behind this project has revealed, this 
might have been the period in which the doctrine played one of its most 
important roles.  
 
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF “LAW OF NATIONS” MENTIONS 
AMONG THE FOUNDERS 
 
 
24 For example, Louis Martin Sears’ Jefferson and the Law of Nations follows the influ-
ence of the doctrine on Jefferson, but mostly in the context of his foreign policy efforts 
after the new Constitution was signed. Louis Martin Sears, Jefferson and the Law of Na-
tions, 13 AM. POL. SCI. R. 379-399 (1919). Edwin D. Dickinson’s The Law of Nations as 
Part of the National Law of the United States addressed the Law of Nations’ influence on 
the structure the Constitution, but not its role in framing the purpose and stakes of the 
Convention. Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the 
United States, 101 U. PA. L. R. 26-56 (1952). Charles G. Fenwick’s The Authority of Vattel 
explored the validity of a famous treatise by that author, but only mentions its applicability 
to United States law and American Constitutional thought in passing. Charles G. Fenwick, 
The Authority of Vattel, 7 AM. POL. SCI. R. 395–410 (1913). 
25 More recently, David Armitage’s The Declaration of Independence and International 
Law addressed the role of the Law of Nations in the framing of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence and International Law, 59 
WM. & MARY L. Q. 39 (2002). Tara Helfman’s The Law of Nations in the Federalist Papers 
explores some of the influences of the Law of Nations on the eponymous papers, but 
does not trace the doctrine’s substantive influence before the Constitutional Convention. 
Tara Helfman, The Law of Nations in the Federalist Papers, 23 J. LEGAL HIST. 107 (2007). 
Other recent works, such as Paul R. Dubinsky’s International Law in the Legal System of 
the United States and Harold Koh’s International Law as Part of Our Law, focus more on 
the incorporation of the Law of Nations into early-American jurisprudence and its subse-
quent death and rebirth in the late twentieth century. Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law 
in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (2010); Harold Koh, 
International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004). 
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The Constitutional Convention of Saba is the most obvious place 
to try to identify how the Law of Nations may have shaped the Constitu-
tion, but this will merely be the starting point of this project. As we’ve 
seen, this paper is not the first to survey the records of the Convention 
for the use of the Law of Nations. It may be the first, however, to use the 
mentions of the Law of Nations at the Convention as a starting point to 
identify which founders embraced the Law of Nation, and to use this to 
conduct a thorough study of these founders’ earlier careers and how and 
why the Law of Nations may have shaped their actions, their thoughts 
and their political calculations. Only then we will return to the Convention 
to attempt to understand what significance, if any, these key founders’ 
motives had on the Constitution. Thanks to the benefit of modern digital 
archives, it’s possible to quickly search the debate records from the Con-
vention as well as the entire archives of some of the most significant 
founders to try to identify quantitatively which founders most often dis-
cussed the subject.  
Max Farrand’s seminal The Records of the Federal Convention 
of ,-.- permits us to conclude that James Madison and Edmund Ran-
dolph introduced and championed the Law of Nations at the Constitu-
tional Convention. The two leading members of the Virginia delegation 
after Washington, they were the first to address the importance of the 
Law of Nations and returned to it at length, far more often than any other 
delegates. Their role in the Convention is clear from the notes of the de-
bates. A search of Farrand’s Records for uses of the “Law of Nations,” a 
very specific and technical phrase, yields a list of six delegates who men-
tioned it:  
 
Table M: Total Mentions of the Law of Nations at the Convention 
by Delegate (In Chronological Order, Earliest to Latest)26 
  
Delegate Total Uses of the Law of Nations 
Edmund Randolph S 
James Madison t 
Oliver Elseworth T 
 
26 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).  
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James Wilson S 
Gouverneur Morris S 
Alexander Hamilton S 
 
Edmund Randolph was the first to use the phrase when he intro-
duced the Virginia Plan at the start of the convention. James Madison 
was the second and addressed the subject most frequently, referring to 
it explicitly on five separate, substantively different occasions. A handful 
of other delegates, including three members of the Committee of Detail 
and Alexander Hamilton, also addressed the subject, though more in 
passing and far less substantively.27 Let’s not forget, however, that the 
records we have of the Convention, while generally considered accurate, 
are not transcriptions and are primarily the work of Madison.28 This could 
introduce a pro-Madison bias. Madison was able to record his own pre-
pared speeches in greater detail than those of his colleagues, and this 
would result in a greater likelihood of finding any given word or phrase in 
the written records of his speeches. This analysis is just a starting point, 
however.   
A search of digitized correspondence from the Founding Era con-
firms the leading proponent of the Law of Nations was Madison, whose 
frequent usage of the doctrine during his career was almost matched by 
Randolph’s. Using the National Archives’ Founders Online digital collec-
 
27 Edmund Randolph “cited many examples” of the “defects” of the Confederation, 
“whi[ch] tended to shew [sic], that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the 
Law of Nations, to be punished.” 1 id. at 19. Madison spoke at length several times in 
connection with the Law of Nations; for example, he strongly opposed Paterson’s NJ 
plan, in part for its inability to “prevent those violations of the Law of Nations & of Treaties 
which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars,” Id. at 315-16, 
and returned to the subject at length to support a strong Federal “negative” on state laws 
that violated treaties or the Law of Nations, pointing out lessons from history supporting 
his contention that small states would be safer as part of a stronger, sovereign nation 
than as weak, independent nations governed by the Law of Nations, Id. at 448-49. By 
comparison, the comments and contributions from Oliver Ellsworth, 1 id. at 74; 2 id. at 
316., Alexander Hamilton, 1 id. at 479, Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson 2 id. at 614-
15, were relatively minor comments or proposals that simply referenced the Law of Na-
tions in passing. 
28 Max Farrand asserts that “all other records [of the Convention] paled into insignifi-
cance” compared to Madison’s notes on the Convention. 1 id. at xv.  
12
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tion—a comprehensive and searchable collection of the papers of Wash-
ington, Madison, Adams, and Jefferson, among others—it’s possible to 
compare in how many documents a given founder mentioned the “Law 
of Nations.” The results of this search mirror the results previously ob-
served in Farrand’s Records. Of the twenty-five Founders who men-
tioned the doctrine the most over their careers, Madison was the most 
prolific: 
 
Table W: Total Mentions of the “Law of Nations” in the Digitized 
Papers of each Founder (top W[ only)29 
  
Founder Total  
Mentions 
Percent of  
Total 
S) James Madison Smb SV.{{% 
T) John Adams SmS Sb.mR% 
R) Thomas Jefferson S{a Sa.US% 
{) Alexander Hamilton bb SU.SV% 
t) George Washington {U {.mR% 
m) Benjamin Franklin Rb {.{U% 
a) Edmund Randolph RT R.aU% 
b) John Quincy Adams SV T.TU% 
V) James Monroe Sa S.Va% 
* Remaining top Z[ (#s ,^ – Z[) ,[a ,-..Z% 
 
Narrowing this list to only delegates at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the delegates who most regularly mentioned the Law of Nations in 
their writing were, from most frequent to least, James Madison, Alexan-
der Hamilton, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Edmund Ran-
dolph: 
 
Table ]: Mentions of the “Law of Nations” by Delegates 
at the Constitutional Convention.30  
 
 
29 Founders Online, NAT'L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/. 
30 Id. 
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 James Madison Smb 
 Alexander Hamilton bb 
 George Washington {U 
 Benjamin Franklin Rb 
 Edmund Randolph RT 
 Charles Pinckney SR 
 Rufus King a 
 Gouverneur Morris a 
 
Not all the delegates were active participants, however, and their 
fondness for the Law of Nations wouldn’t necessarily give birth to mean-
ingful constitutional provisions. For example, George Washington rarely 
engaged in debate.31 Benjamin Franklin was the elder statesman and 
participated infrequently.32 Likewise, Hamilton was frequently absent and 
had only a minor role at the Convention.33 Thus, of the most active dele-
gates, the Law of Nations appears to have been most significant to the 
careers and writings of James Madison and Edmund Randolph.  
 
III. A CURIOUS COMMAND OF THE LAW OF NATIONS  
 
Identifying that Madison was one of the chief advocates of the 
Law of Nations at the Convention makes the task of identifying the doc-
trine’s influence on the Constitution somewhat easier. Madison’s own in-
fluence on the document is legendary, and one of his biographers even 
went so far as to claim that “for better or worse, as we consider ‘the 
framer’s intent,’ we are, preeminently, examining Madison’s intent.”34 
While this doesn’t reveal anything about the specific impact of the Law of 
Nations at the Convention, it does invite further investigation into why 
Madison and Randolph were such fierce advocates, and, more im-
portantly, what they hoped to achieve in Philadelphia. As we’ll see, their 
 
31 JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER & CHRISTOPER COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA 108 (1986). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 77. 
34 ix (Preface to the Paperback edition) 
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careers shared some striking similarities, notably years spent struggling 
to solve international disputes presented by Virginia’s expansive territo-
rial claims and shared borders with global empires. They quickly recog-
nized that the parties involved appealed regularly to the Law of Nations 
and looked to it for some framework to resolve otherwise intractable dis-
putes. They both came to recognize its significance as the lingua franca 
of treatymaking and diplomacy and, perhaps more significantly to the 
present task of analyzing how the doctrine shaped our governing docu-
ments, they came to see the rules and norms set forth in the Law of Na-
tions as the absolute minimum obligations the states needed to fulfill to 
earn the label of a “nation.”    
Randolph and Madison’s immersion in the Law of Nations dates 
to at least SabU, when they became intimately involved in two of the first 
and most intractable international disputes facing the independent states. 
Both stemmed from the Americans’ desire to profit from the former colo-
nies’ vast but poorly-demarcated frontier lands. The first such dispute 
was the states’ ongoing quarrel over who should now own those lands—
the states or Congress? Virginia had the largest land claims and some 
states refused to join the Confederation unless Virginia accepted the 
Confederation’s right to arbitrate conflicting claims.35 The second, related 
dispute was the long struggle to convince Spain to recognize the Ameri-
cans’ rights to navigate the Mississippi River.36 These two issues were 
intimately linked. Resolving the overlapping land claims was a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to profit from the western lands. If the Ameri-
cans failed to secure water access to this land—most of which lay over 
the mountains, along the Mississippi—its value would decline substan-
tially or perhaps be lost entirely.37  
The land disputes predated the Revolution and, after independ-
ence, nearly prevented the formation of the Confederation as the states 
bitterly contested one another’s claims using the Law of Nations. Some 
states, like Virginia, had immense claims while others, like New Jersey, 
 
35 MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 150-51 (1970). 
36 CHRISTOPER COLLIER, supra note 31, at 214-5. 
37  31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 586 (John C. Fitzpatrick 
ed., 1785).  
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Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, had their bound-
aries firmly defined, with little or no land in the west.38 Citizens in these 
landless states formed land companies—such as the Indiana Com-
pany—to purchase western land from the Indians within Virginia’s claims 
and resell it to speculators.39 Virginia tried to stop these sales, and, in 
response, the land companies argued that the Law of Nations held that 
the Confederation and not Virginia had the right to judge their claims.40 
The Indiana Company, for example, argued that under the Law of Nations 
“the United States as Succesors [sic] to the Sovereignty [of the king] are 
the only Judges [of its claim].”41 The Virginians, for their part, labored to 
ensure that Articles of Confederation explicitly preserved their power over 
their western lands and in this they succeeded, at least on paper, with 
the inclusion of language in Article V section T providing that “no State 
shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States.”42 Dis-
satisfied with this result, Maryland refused to join the Confederation until 
Virginia finally ceded most of its western territory voluntarily to Congress 
in January of SabS.43 
Madison and Randolph served together in Virginia’s delegation to 
Congress during the height of the land disputes, an occasion that af-
forded ample opportunity for firsthand experience trying to resolve inter-
state (and international) disputes using only the Law of Nations. Madison 
initially hoped that all parties would voluntarily put the needs of the Union 
over abstract legal claims. Initially, he saw the land claims as “the only 
obstacle with Maryland . . . [entering] into the Confederation . . . .  [Vir-
ginia] will see the necessity of closing the Union, in too strong a light to 
 
38 JENSEN, supra note 35, at 150-1. 
39 Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 1781-1784, 26 MISS. VALLEY HIST. 
REV. 323, 323-27 (1939). 
40 Id.. at 327. 
41 George Morgan, The Memorial of the Proprietors of a Tract of Land Called Indiana, in 
6 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS 30 (1886). 
42 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX. (U.S. 1781). For further background on the origins 
of this language and the efforts of the Virginian delegation, see Merrill Jensen, The 
Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST.REV. 27, 33 (1936). 
43 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the 
American Territorial System, 29 WM & MARY Q. 231, 234-35 (1972); Jensen, supra note 
42, at 36. 
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oppose the only expedient that can accomplish it.”44 This impulse—to 
prioritize the collective good over sectional or State interests—is one 
Madison would exhibit throughout the seven-year period prior to Saba. 
Unfortunately, the land companies and the other states’ delegations did 
not share his zeal. They often used whatever methods they could to ad-
vocate for their interests. For instance, in October of SabS, the Virginia 
delegation, then composed of Madison, Randolph, and Joseph Jones, 
was called to again justify Virginia’s title to its remaining western lands.45 
Even though Virginia had previously secured protections for her land 
claims in Article V section T of the Articles of Confederation, its opponents 
now challenged those claims under another provision.46 Article V section 
T also made Congress the last resort on appeal of “all disputes and dif-
ferences . . . concerning boundary.”47 Madison drafted the delegation’s 
response and, rather than argue the merits of Virginia’s claims, refused 
to submit to Congress’ authority for lack of proper form and notice.48 One 
wonders if Madison would think back to this moment in the years to come 
and remember just how far a determined party would try push unclear or 
conflicting constitutional language from its original intent. One of the rea-
sons Article V section T of the Articles even contained a prohibition on 
depriving a state’s “territory for the benefit of the United States” was to 
protect Virginia’s land.49  
Around the same time, Congress gave Madison an opportunity to 
shape the Confederation’s negotiations with Spain using the Law of Na-
tions. The Spanish controlled the Mississippi River at the time, and they 
were reluctant to give the American states the same rights to use the river 
that they had given to the British colonies. In response, Congress sent 
 
44 From James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 12, 1780), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 80-83 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1962). 
45 JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH 48 (1975). 
46 The response of Virginia’s delegation took an eminently lawyerly approach by respond-
ing all possible arguments against their State’s claims. Their response includes a coun-
terargument to “an opinion that Congress may exercise jurisdiction in territorial contro-
versies between individual States,” showing this provision of Article 9 section 2 was or 
could be invoked in the dispute. Protest of Virginia Delegates (Oct. 10, 1781), in 3 PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 44, at 284-86. 
47 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX. (U.S. 1781) 
48 3 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 44, at 284-86. 
49 Jensen, supra note 42, at 33. 
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John Jay to Madrid to negotiate. The Virginian delegation, however, was 
afraid that Jay might trade away some of the land claims their State had 
given to the Confederation and insisted that certain limits be placed upon 
Jay’s authority.50 Madison was appointed to head the committee charged 
with justifying these limits, limits which required that Jay “insist on the 
navigation of the Mississippi for the citizens of the United States.”51  
The multipage text of this Committee’s SabU instructions to Jay, 
written in Madison’s own hand, relied heavily on the Law of Nations.52 
The report mirrors in many ways Madison’s much later and celebrated 
“Vices of the Political System of the United States” and is arguably one 
of the first documents reflecting his thoughts on flaws of the Articles, par-
ticularly in the conduct of foreign affairs. Meant as a template to convince 
the Spanish—ostensibly American allies—to accept American access to 
the Mississippi, the report presented not just legal arguments in favor of 
the Americans’ claims but also a series of pragmatic reasons why the 
United States would be a much stronger ally if Spain simply conceded. 
The report was the product of a three-man committee and cannot be 
solely attributed to Madison, but it was written in his hand and reflects 
the concerns he would fixate on over the next six years, suggesting he 
was the primary author.53 First, it conceded that some land east of the 
Mississippi might belong to Spain by right, but, practically, the growing 
number of American settlers and “their great distance [from the American 
government] would render it difficult [for the American government] to re-
strain [them].”54 Second, even if Spain had a valid legal claim to any of 
the disputed land in the region, some states saw the same land “as no 
less their property than any other territory within their limits, Congress 
could not relinquish it without exciting discussions between themselves 
and those States”55 Third, the “territory in question contains a number of 
inhabitants who . . . at present . . . have sworn allegiance to [the United 
 
50 Motion on Instructions to John Jay (Dec. 8, 1780), in 2 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra 
note 44, at 231-32.   
51 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 37, at 935.  
52 Draft of Letter to John Jay, Explaining His Instructions (Oct. 17, 1780), in 2 PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 44, at 127-136..  
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States].”56 Finally, the disputed territory represented “so much value to 
the United States . . .” and was “one of the material funds on which they 
rely for pursuing the war.”57  
Madison’s instructions reflect a clear understanding the Confed-
eration lacked the practical ability to control its borders, an issue that 
could lead to an unwanted conflict with Spain where the border regions 
demanded policies the rest of the Confederation could not or would not 
support. The Americans needed the disputed border land to pay for the 
war, and Spain’s refusal to yield would only create further tension be-
tween the states that didn’t need river access and those most desperate 
to capture the value of the western frontier. Aggressive frontiersmen who 
claimed allegiance to the United States were essentially so attached to 
the land they were uncontrollable, whatever Spain’s legal rights might be. 
Finally, discord between the states and the Confederation was the likely 
outcome if Spain did not voluntarily comply with the Americans’ demands; 
there was no mention of what the Americans might do collectively to 
change the Spaniards’ minds. In short, the committee predicted this one 
issue could destabilize the entire Confederation, even drag it into a con-
flict with Spain that it was neither prepared for nor in favor of. Its instruc-
tions tacitly accepted that Spain could use the issue of the Mississippi to 
divide and weaken the Confederation. 
Edmund Randolph’s early career mirrored Madison’s in several 
important ways, overlapping in time, place, and an appreciation for the 
importance of the Law of Nations, particularly as it applied to the western 
lands and foreign affairs. Madison first met Randolph at the Virginia Con-
vention of May Saam, and the pair later developed a close, personal rela-
tionship during their time serving together in Congress in SabS.58 Ran-
dolph’s second committee assignment in May of that year paired him 
directly with Madison. They were both assigned to craft an amendment 
to the Articles to give the Confederation the power to carry out lawful 
resolutions within states that refused to comply voluntarily.59 Randolph 




58 REARDON, supra note 45, at 43. 
59 Id. at 45. 
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spirited defenses of Virginia’s western land claims.60 Seated on a com-
mittee that reviewed one of the land companies’ petitions, Randolph 
crafted a response so “belligerent” that Congress ordered it stricken from 
the Congressional record.61 Mirroring Madison’s assignment to the com-
mittee to justify limitations on Jay’s negotiating power, Randolph was as-
signed to a committee tasked with justifying instructions to the peace 
commissioners to insist on the Americans’ fishing rights off Newfound-
land.62 This was a major issue, as significant to the eastern states as the 
Mississippi was to the western settlers and the South. It was what Ham-
ilton would later call one of the “great” rights of the Union, along with 
navigation rights on the Mississippi and the western land claims.63  
The two Virginians corresponded frequently, often discussing the 
interplay between international affairs and the Law of Nations. In SabR, 
Madison wrote to discuss Jay’s ongoing negotiations with Spain. He was 
particularly concerned with the requirement of the Law of Nations that all 
states obey the Confederation’s treaties. As he noted to Randolph, cer-
tain states had interests that ran completely counter to the provisions 
Spain was demanding. It was more than likely they would ignore treaties 
unfavorable to them as the union appeared to lacked a sufficient deter-
rent to the “strong temptation to [take] measures . . . which may first in-
volve the whole confederacy in controversies with foreign nations.”64 
Randolph, likewise, often sought Madison’s advice. For example, in early 
Sab{ he was serving as Virginia’s Attorney General and relied heavily on 
the Law of Nations to determine how to respond to an interstate dispute 
the Articles had not properly addressed.65 Madison was only too happy 
to respond to Randolph’s request for advice, giving his own, lengthy 
views on what the Law of Nations required.66  
By Sab{, both Randolph and Madison, seated at the center of Vir-
ginian and American politics, started to recognize serious and repeated 
 
60 Id. at 48. 
61 Id. at 47-48. 
62 Id. at 53. 
63 THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton). 
64 From James Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 20, 1783), in 7 PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 58-64 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal, eds., 19XX).  
65 See 7 id. at 415-18 (editors’ note). 
66 From James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 10, 1784) in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 3-6 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds. 1973). 
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violations of the Law of Nations among the states, the significance of 
which appeared to be largely trivialized or unrecognized by the worst of-
fenders. This led them to conclude the Confederation lacked the power 
to enforce its treaty obligations, and, worse still, many of the states lacked 
the will to restrain some of their more restive, populist elements living on 
their frontiers. Frontier settlers and state governments began to gross 
restless and push the boundaries, figuratively and literally, they were en-
titled to under the Law of Nations. The two Virginians recognized the 
growing peril this presented under the Law of Nations as it gave powerful, 
European empires along their borders an excuse to repudiate their treaty 
obligations or to invade. This looming crisis apparently pushed Madison 
to a key realization that subsequently shaped his views of how a federal 
government had to operate. Madison realized that, under the Law of Na-
tions, the most likely treatment of the Confederation was as a group of 
sovereign states rather than a single sovereign. This meant that each 
state had a shared legal responsibility for the treaty violations of its fel-
lows—a sort of joint or several liability. Weak or restive states could push 
the boundaries of acceptable behavior without bearing the full cost. Even 
if the Confederation fractured, all of its former members would likely be 
responsible for the transgressions of their former co-members. For 
wealthy states like Virginia, with a lot to lose, this was particularly trou-
bling as some of the poorest and weakest states, namely the deep south, 
pressed relentlessly farther westward, challenging the Spanish Empire, 
numerous Indian nations and even one another to stop them. As we’ll 
see, this strongly shaped Madison’s thinking that a new Union had to 
have strong limits on states’ ability to violate the Law of Nations and the 
states most likely to break the law were the ones that most needed to 
accept these limits.   
Between Sab{ and Sabm, Madison developed close personal and 
political ties to the western settlers and came to understand their relent-
less drive west made it highly unlikely they could be restrained from east 
of the mountains. In December Sab{, many of Kentucky’s leading men 
gathered on their own authority to discuss their grievances with their dis-
tant government in Richmond and to consider secession from Virginia.67 
 
67 Thomas P. Abernethy, Journal of the First Kentucky Convention Dec. 27, 1784-Jan. 5, 
1785, 1 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 67 (1935). 
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Madison learned of this convention and shared its existence with Ran-
dolph in a March Sabt letter.68 He viewed it positively to the extent its aim 
was to form a new state within the Confederation, and he thought the 
exercise could serve as a test case for future territories becoming 
states.69 He would become intimately involved in furthering this end as 
an advocate for the westerners’ interests in Virginia’s legislature, a role 
that included advising its leaders on writing a state constitution and serv-
ing as the chairman of the committee that crafted Virginia’s response to 
Kentucky’s subsequent petition for secession in December of Sabt.70 
The nature of western secession and expansion took on a more 
sinister tone, however, as frustration mounted over the closure of the 
Mississippi. Simultaneously, the willingness of states like Georgia to deal 
directly with both border separatists and the Spanish made it increasingly 
likely the situation in the west could escalate into armed conflict. Jay’s 
negotiations with Spain stalled and the Mississippi was closed to Ameri-
can traffic in April of Sab{. Not long after, the Virginia House of Delegates 
was inundated with reports of border unrest fueled by frustration over the 
closure of the river.71 As usual, Madison was at the forefront of reminding 
his colleagues of their obligations under the Law of Nations. He grumbled 
to Monroe that there was no “due sense of those duties which spring from 
our relation to foreign nations. . . . [W]e are every day threaten’d by the 
eagourness of our disorderly Citizens [on the border] for Spanish plunder 
& Spanish blood.”72 Further troubling signs suggested it wasn’t only dis-
orderly citizens that might neglect their duties to foreign nations but other 
 
68 From James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 10, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 66, at 243-45. 
69 Madison wrote to Monroe that these new states, “[i]f they pursue their object [state-
hood] through this channel [Congressional petititons], they will not only accomplish it with-
out difficulty, but set a useful example to other Western Settlemts which may chuse to be 
lopped off from other States.” From James Madison to James Monroe (May 29, 1785), in 
8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 66, at 285-87. 
70 For more information on Madison’s committee assignment and his roles therein, see 8 
id. at 450-53 (editorial note). For more context on Madison’s role in Kentucky’s efforts for 
statehood, see also LOWELL H. HARRISON, KENTUCKY'S ROAD TO STATEHOOD 19-47 (1992).  
For James Madison’s advice to Kentucky’s leading men on how to write a Constitution, 
see From James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 66, at 350-58. 
71 See 8 id. at 124-25 (editorial note). 
72 8 id. at 156-59.  
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states. Multiple sources informed Madison that Georgia had sent two 
Commissioners down the Mississippi to demand the Spanish govern-
ment settle its boundary with them. He was outraged that a “State could 
be guilty either of so flagrant an outrage on the fœderal Constitution, or 
of so imprudent a mode of pursuing their claims against a foreign Na-
tion.”73 Georgia had in fact appointed these commissioners, and it would 
not shy away from even riskier tactics to secure the Mississippi or further 
its territorial claims. After a breakaway state called the State of Franklin 
formed in the western part of North Carolina in Sab{, Georgia was only 
too happy to entertain its overtures in June of Sabt to ally against Indians 
on their shared border.74  
The strength of Madison’s conviction that the Mississippi was the 
issue that could undermine the entire Confederation is clear from the 
lengths he went to stop Jay’s renewed efforts to secure a treaty with 
Spain at the expense of the river. Madison had planned to meet James 
Monroe in New York around June of Sabm to travel to upstate New York.75 
This plan had been in the works since at least February.76 After Madison 
set off for New York, however, he received a letter from Monroe warning 
him of Jay’s renewed effort to secure a treaty with Spain.77 Jay had been 
frustrated by the dogged insistence of Spain’s negotiator, Diego de 
Gardoqui, that Spain would never allow the Americans to use the Missis-
sippi. Determined to secure something, he was convinced a deal could 
be reached if Congress temporarily gave up river access.78 Jay petitioned 
Congress in May to authorize a three-man committee to review his in-
structions, apparently hoping Madison’s SabU limits would be removed.79 
Unfortunately for Jay, the committee included James Monroe, who im-
mediately warned Madison that Jay had alluded to “difficulties” in the ne-
gotiations. Monroe speculated that Jay’s request was meant as “cover” 
 
73 8 id. at 306-09.  
74 THOMAS MARSHALL GREEN, THE SPANISH CONSPIRACY. A REVIEW OF EARLY SPANISH 
MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTHWEST 74-79 (1967); Samuel Cole Williams, HISTORY OF THE LOST 
STATE OF FRANKLIN 78 (1974). 
75 From James Madison to James Monroe (Mar. 19, 1786), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 66, at 504-06. 
76 8 id. at 490-91. 
77 9 id. at 68-73. 
78 Id. (editorial note).  
79 Id.. 
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to allow him to give up the river permanently.80 Madison wrote back that 
he planned to discuss the subject in person and arrived in New York in 
mid-July, a few weeks before Congress took up Jay’s request.81 Rather 
than proceed North as he had planned, Madison stayed in New York for 
a few weeks, finally departing for Virginia just a few days after the issue 
was referred to the Committee of the Whole on August S.82 Writing shortly 
to Jefferson after he left New York, Madison remarked that Jay’s actions 
led him to “despair” of having any success at the Annapolis Convention.83 
He feared the resulting controversy would spark a “separation of interest 
and affection between the western and eastern settlements and . . . fo-
ment the jealousy between the eastern & southern States.”84 
The Virginia delegation’s response to Jay’s proposal was almost 
certainly crafted with Madison’s assistance, and it neatly condenses the 
troubling defect in the Articles Madison had wrestled with for several 
years, namely that the Confederation in theory had treatymaking author-
ity but lacked useful enforcement mechanisms. First, we know Madison 
assisted because Monroe had in fact explicitly asked for aid.85 Though 
Madison’s precise contributions cannot be easily determined, the re-
sponse the Virginian delegation ultimately submitted to Congress on Au-
gust TV bore the signs of Madison’s familiarity with the Law of Nations. It 
heavily cited Vattel’s treatise, arguing that Jay’s treaty could not legally 
compel individual states to cede navigation rights on the Mississippi. The 
Law of Nations required that “when a limited power [e.g. a negotiator] is 
 
80 Id. 
81 For Madison’s response to Monroe, see From James Madison to James Monroe, (June 
21, 1786), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 82-85 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. 
Rachal, eds., 1975). Madison likely arrived in mid-July as Monroe’s mid-July letter ex-
pected his imminent arrival as Madison had reached Philadelphia a few weeks earlier. 
See 9 id. at 88-89. 
82 Madison wrote from Philadelphia on August 12th that he had left New York “a few days 
before.” He must have departed after August 7th as he wrote another letter from New 
York on that day. 9 id. at 89-91. For further information about the timing of the debate in 
Congress, see 9 id. at 68-73 (editorial note). 
83 9 id. at 93-100. 
84 Id. 
85 Writing to Madison in July, Monroe told him he “shod. be happy you cod. give us as 
much of yr. time as possible here for reasons more self-interested. Of these we shall 
confer when we meet.” Given their preceding correspondence had been on Jay’s treaty, 
it’s a reasonable conclusion he was asking for Madison’s assistance in responding to 
Jay. 9 id. at 88-89. 
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authorized to make peace … it must be required that the treaty of peace 
be approved by the nation or the power which can make good the condi-
tion.”86 This principle interacted with the Article T in a troubling way, as: 
 
[E]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independ-
ence … [t]his is a fundamental law of the nation and the 
powers granted in the ninth article to make treaties must be 
construed in subordination to it. No treaty of peace entered 
into by the United States … extending to a cession or sus-
pension of the rights of any of the states without their con-
sent can therefore be valid.87  
 
This passage very closely parallels the concerns Madison had expressed 
to Randolph earlier in his May SabR letter on the very same negotiations, 
when he had questioned to what extent “permanent engagements en-
tered into by the Confederacy with foreign powers . . . by the States in 
their fœderal character are binding on each of them separately.”88 The 
Virginian delegation now offered up their best response. The Law of Na-
tions empowered each state to unilaterally refuse to give up their share 
of a right shared by all states. And yet Jay could negotiate a treaty that 
stated otherwise; the Confederation could ratify it; and the Law of Nations 
would demand it be upheld. Individual holdout states could violate it, 
however, no matter the cost to the whole Confederation. 
Randolph was elected governor of Virginia in November of Sabm, 
just as Madison’s worst fears about the consequences of Jay’s treaty on 
the border were coming true.89 The same month Randolph took office, 
George Rogers Clark, a former Congressional Indian Commissioner and 
Revolutionary War Brigadier General, joined a group of separatists in In-
diana whose stated goal was to right the wrongs threatened by Jay’s pro-
posed treaty, a “cruel, oppressive and unjust” work of both “the Spaniards 
 
86 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 37, at 589. 
87 Id. (emphasis added). 
88 From James Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 20, 1783), in 7 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 58-64 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal eds. 1971).  
89 REARDON, supra note 45, at 87. 
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and Congress.”90 The group, led in part by Thomas Green, one of the 
commissioners Georgia had sent years earlier to negotiate with the 
Spanish, threatened to invade Spanish lands, confiscate Spanish goods, 
and foment war with the Indians “in retaliation for their [the Spaniards’] 
many offenses.”91 George Muter and Caleb Wallace, two of Madison’s 
acquaintances in Kentucky, intercepted a letter written by Green to Geor-
gia’s Governor, asking him for his guidance, and, apparently, permission 
to conduct negotiations directly with the Spanish and the local Indians.92 
Muter and Wallace, together with a group of Kentucky’s most prominent 
leading men, forwarded this troubling letter to Randolph on TT December 
Sabm.93 They also forwarded a circular Green had taken “great pain … to 
circulate copies” of, dated { December Sabm.94 It claimed that: 
 
[P]oliticks, which a few months ago were scarcely thought 
of are now sounded aloud in this part of the world . . . [due 
to the] late Commercial Treaty with Spain, in shutting up, as 
it is said, the navigation of the Mississippi . . . . Do you think 
to prevent the emigration from a barren Country loaded with 
Taxes and impoverished with debts to the most luxurious 
and fertile Soil in the world? . . . We can raise twenty thou-
sand troops this side the Alleghany and Apalachian [sic] 
Mountains and the annual increase of them by emigration, 
from other parts, is from two to four thousand. . . . Prepara-
tions are now making here (if necessary) to drive the Span-
iards from their settlements, at the mouth of the Missis-
sippi.95 
 
90 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 194-95 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 
1936) (emphasis added).  
91 For more on Green’s background, see From James Madison to James Monroe (June 
21, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 66, at 306-09.  
For Green’s threats, see 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 
195.  
92 For background of how the Kentucky Founding Fathers came across Green’s letters, 
see GREEN, supra note 74, at 76. For the letter to Georgia’s Governor, see id. at 385. 
93 Id.. at 76-78. 
94 For the precise sequence of correspondence, see id. at 75. For the text of the circular, 
see 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 197. 
95 32 id. at 197-99. 
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Lest its readers overestimate the westerners’ loyalty to the United States, 
the circular reminded them that in “case we are not countenanced and 
succoured by the United States (if we need it) our allegiance will be 
thrown off, and some other power applied to. Great Britain stands ready 
with open arms to receive and support us.”96 Madison, in turn, received 
a separate “dismal” account of Clark’s exploits, describing his actions as 
“playing hell,” and he dutifully relayed these to Randolph.97  
The Virginians’ attempts to apologize to the Spanish for Clark’s 
conduct only confirmed their fears that Spain hoped to exploit such fla-
grant violations of the Law of Nations. On March St, Saba, Randolph in-
structed Madison to inform Diego de Gardqoui that Virginia had disa-
vowed General Clark’s seizure of Spanish property and initiated legal 
proceedings against him and his men.98 In response, Gardoqui remarked 
that the practical “result of what was said was, that Congress could enter 
into no treaty at all.”99 The envoy then “intimated, with a jocular air, the 
possibility of the Western people becoming Spanish subjects; and, with 
a serious one, that such an idea had been brought forward to the King of 
Spain by some persons connected with the Western Country.”100 At the 
same time, other, unnamed sources “hinted” to Madison “that British par-
tisans are already feeling the pulse of some of the West settlements. . . . 
The eye of France also can not fail to watch over the western pro-
spects.”101 The Confederation had no practical control over its borders or 
dissenting factions, creating an opportunity for Spain and, presumably, 
other opportunistic European powers. Madison knew this, Randolph 
knew it, and Spain knew it. 
Madison and Randolph worked together to ensure that Congress 
understood the seriousness of the situation, particularly the growing 
number of people and governments in the border regions claiming to act 
on behalf of the Confederation. In March Saba, Randolph sent Madison a 
 
96 32 id. at 199. 
97 From James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 18, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 271-74 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1975).  
98 9 id. at 313. 
99 9 id. at 337-40. 
100 Id. 
101 9 id. at 317-22. 
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long dossier to lay before Congress containing evidence of (S) the various 
illegal actions taken by Clark against the Spanish, (T) the growth of the 
secessionist movements on the border, and (R) the related involvement 
of the governments of Virginia, Georgia, and North Carolina.102 These 
documents were delivered to John Jay, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
who then presented them to Congress on April St, Saba.103 In response 
to Virginia’s evidence of the instability on the border, Jay had a dramatic 
change of heart and told Congress that, however the body might want to 
proceed, the Confederation lacked the legal and practical ability to carry 
its wishes out.  
John Jay’s stark reversal on the Mississippi issue immediately af-
ter reviewing the Virginians’ evidence strongly suggests that it was the 
instability on the border and the attendant consequences under the Law 
of Nations, more than anything else, that convinced skeptics the Confed-
eration urgently needed some mechanism to prevent the encroachment 
of states and wayward settlers on the conduct of foreign affairs. Jay had 
opposed Madison’s repeated appeals to avoid this sensitive issue for al-
most seven years. Now, instilled with some of the knowledge of border 
politics Madison had, Jay agreed that, from “the Temper visible in some 
of the Papers sent from the Western Country . . . the period is not distant 
when the United States must decide either to wage War with Spain, or 
settle all differences with her by Treaty.”104 Unfortunately, Jay admitted,  
the present impotence of Congress made both choices—war or a 
treaty—seem destined for failure as: 
 
A Treaty disagreeable to one half of the Nation had better 
not be made, for it would be violated, and that a War disliked 
by the other half, would promise but little success, especially 
under a Government so greatly influenced and affected by 
popular Opinion.105  
 
102 The Virginian delegates discussed Randolph’s instructions in 9 id. at 324-26. For the 
contents of the dossier they delivered see 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 
supra note 90, at 189-204. Finally, according to Thomas Marshall Green, Madison was 
the Virginian delegate to Congress who ultimately delivered the documents to Congress, 
see GREEN, supra note 74, at 79. 
103 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 90, at 189. 
104 Id. at 192-93. 
105 Id. at 203-04. 
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Even Jay now concurred that the Confederation possessed no mecha-
nism to require all its members to pursue a unified foreign policy.  
 
IV. THE LAW OF NATIONS AND MADISON’S PROPOSED CONSTITU-
TIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
With this understanding of how formative a role the Law of Na-
tions had in forming Madison’s conviction the Confederation could not 
continue to function, it’s suddenly obvious that his preparation for the 
Convention was not a stroke of genius or frenzied effort so much as a 
seamless extension of his years-long effort to get the states to adhere to 
the Law of Nations.  For example, his much-celebrated “Vices of the Po-
litical Constitution of the United States,” written in April of Saba, clearly 
reflects his desire to give the central government a meaningful monopoly 
over foreign affairs.106 While “Vices” is often cited as evidence that Mad-
ison began his preparations for the Virginia plan in the early winter of 
Saba, it is more appropriately seen as the culmination and synthesis of 
the six years he spent struggling to get the Confederation to behave in 
accordance with the Law of Nations. His criticisms read much like a sum-
mary of the crises he had fought in Congress and in Virginia’s House of 
Delegates. First, it lamented the obvious “[f]ailure of the States to comply 
with the Constitutional requirements.”107 Second, it noted the “[e]ncroach-
ments by the States on the federal authority,” including the example of 
“the wars and Treaties of Georgia with the Indians.”108 Third, it pointed 
out the persistent “[v]iolations of the Law of Nations and of treaties” by 
individual states.109 Finally, “Vices” ended with a powerful warning that 




106 Vices of the Political System of the United States, April 1787, in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
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As yet foreign powers have not been rigorous in animadvert-
ing on [paying attention to] us. This moderation however 
cannot be mistaken for a permanent partiality to our faults, 
or a permanent security agst. [sic] those disputes with other 
nations, which being among the greatest of public calami-
ties, it ought to be least in the power of any part of the Com-
munity to bring on the whole.110  
 
Thus, Madison’s first attempt to outline the raison d’être for a new Con-
stitution is substantially dedicated to the interplay between foreign policy, 
the Articles, and the Law of Nations. The significance of foreign affairs, 
in particular, is further underscored by the timing of Madison’s work. As 
he was preparing “Vices,” he and the Virginia Congressional delegation 
were preparing for Congress the dossier detailing the states’ numerous 
violations of the Law of Nations, violations so serious that even John Jay, 
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, apparently no longer believed the Con-
federation could predictably control its own foreign affairs.   
Madison’s efforts to solicit feedback on the emerging elements of 
his Virginia Plan also reflect the singular importance to him of stopping 
violations of the Law of Nations. Writing to Washington that same April 
he wrote “Vices,” arguably his most prominent concern was that the 
states would continue to violate the Law of Nations when it suited their 
individual interests. Madison thought that the: 
 
[I]ndividual independence of the States is utterly irrecon-
cileable [sic] with their aggregate sovereignty; . . . I would 
propose next that in addition to the present federal powers, 
the national Government should be armed with positive and 
compleat [sic] authority in all cases which require uniformity 
[such as complying with treaties]. . . . Over and above this 
positive power, a negative in all cases whatsoever on the 
legislative acts of the States . . . appears to me to be abso-
lutely necessary. . . . Without this defensive power, every 
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defeated. The States will continue to invade the national ju-
risdiction, to violate treaties and the law of nations [empha-
sis added] & to Taarass [sic] each other with rival and spite-
ful measures dictated by mistaken views of interest.111  
 
He fixated on the “business with Spain … [which was] becoming 
extremely delicate, and the information from the Western settlements 
truly alarming.”112  
Like Madison, Randolph saw the Convention as an opportunity to 
craft a governing compact that could balance the uniform demands of the 
Law of Nations with the states’ inevitable desire to satisfy divergent, do-
mestic interests. He certainly shared Madison’s broader concerns that 
the westerners would likely trigger a war.113 He famously opened the pro-
ceedings of the Convention on May TV, Saba by presenting Madison’s 
Virginia Plan, preceded only by his own diagnosis that the major flaw of 
the Confederation was, “[i]f a State acts against a foreign power contrary 
to the laws of nations or violates a treaty, it [the Confederation] cannot 
punish that State, or compel its obedience to the treaty. It can only leave 
the offending state to the operations of the offended power. It therefore 
cannot prevent a war.”114 The Confederation’s inability to enforce the Law 
of Nations was only made worse by the selfish and divergent actions of 
“thirteen legislatures, viewing commerce under different relations, and 
fancying themselves, discharged from every obligation to concede the 
smallest of their commercial advantages for the benefit of the whole.”115 
Both Rudolph’s and Madison’s desired mechanism to exclude the 
states from foreign affairs was an absolute veto to prevent states from 
violating treaties and the Law of Nations, a project whose roots go back 
 
111 From James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 97, at 382-87. 
112 Id. 
113 Writing on March 1st. 1787, he remarked that the reports he had received on the border 
issues “prove the truth of your suspicion, that the occlusion [closure] of the Missi. to Vir-
ginia, would throw the western settlers into an immediate state of hostility with Spain.” To 
James Madison from Edmund Randolph (Mar. 1, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 97, at 301-02. 
114 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 24-25. 
115 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 265 (John P 
Kaminski et al. eds., 19XX).  
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some five years. Madison would refer to this veto as a “negative” at the 
Convention. It appears both men favored this solution as early as SabS, 
as it echoes the spirit of a Congressional Committee they served on that 
year.116 That committee was tasked with amending the Articles to give 
Congress the power to compel states to comply with its lawful resolu-
tions. In private correspondence, Madison claimed the committee’s goal 
was to give Congress “coercive powers” to “compel obedience” from the 
states.117 The committee’s draft amendment to the Articles stated that it 
was written pursuant to: 
 
[A] general and implied power is vested in the United States 
in Congress assembled to enforce and carry into effect all 
the Articles of the said Confederation against any of the 
States which shall refuse or neglect to abide by such their 
determinations, or shall otherwise violate any of the said Ar-
ticles.118  
 
When Randolph introduced the Virginia Plan five years later, it also in-
cluded a coercive right of the national legislature to: 
 
Negative all laws passed by the several States, contraven-
ing in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of 
Union; and to call forth the force of the Union agst. [sic] any 
member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the arti-
cles thereof.119 
 
The similarities in the descriptions are remarkable and betray the shared 
lineage of both men’s thinking about the need for Constitutional reform. 
Certainly Madison wrote the plan, but Randolph introduced it and, more-
over, his comments to the delegates before introducing the plan indicate 
he agreed with Madison that the Confederation suffered because: 
 
 
116 REARDON, supra note 45, at 45. 
117 Id. 
118 Proposed Amendment of Articles of Confederation (Mar. 12, 1781), 3 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 17-20 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1963). 
119 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26. 
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It does not provide against foreign invasion. If a State acts 
against a foreign power contrary to the laws of nations or 
violates a treaty, it cannot punish that State, or compel its 
obedience to the treaty. It can only leave the offending State 
to the operations of the offended power. It therefore cannot 
prevent a war. … A State may encroach on foreign posses-
sions in its neighbourhood and Congress cannot prevent 
it.120 
 
Though officially proposed by Randolph, the negative was clearly 
of utmost importance to Madison, who urged the delegates that “an in-
definite power to negative legislative acts of the States [w]as absolutely 
necessary to a perfect system.”121 The negative’s relationship to foreign 
affairs is clear from Madison’s comments that, without it, there was a 
“constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority; to 
violate national Treaties, to infringe the rights & interests of each 
other.”122 The close relationship between the negative and violations of 
the Law of Nations in the Virginia Plan is evident in the similarities be-
tween Madison’s warning in “Vices” about the consequences of contin-
ued violations of the Law of Nations and the justifications he gave for the 
negative on the Convention floor. In “Vices,” he warned of “the power of 
any part of the Community to bring [reprisals] on the whole” by continued 
transgressions against foreign powers.123 At the Convention, he insisted 
it was the negative that could prevent a “small proportion of the Commu-
nity in a compact situation, acting on the defensive, and at one of its ex-
tremities might at any time bid defiance to the National authority.124 The 
similarities in language and purpose are unmistakable.  
 
V. THE RESURRECTION OF MADISON’S FEDERAL “NEGATIVE”    
 
It’s clear at this point that Madison thought the Law of Nations 
was important and that the Constitution would need to compel the states 
 
120 Id. at 24-25. 
121 Id. at 164. 
122 Id. 
123 Vices of the Political System of the United States, April 1787, 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 97, at 245-58.  
124 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 164. 
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to uphold its tenets. We can even say with some certainty that the Virginia 
Plan and “Vices” were both written with an eye towards ensuring compli-
ance with the Law of Nations. What specific features of the resulting Con-
stitution, however, can we point to as direct results of the Law of Nations? 
We know Madison wanted a strong federal power to halt any state viola-
tions of the Law of Nations or the nation’s treaties. The mechanism he 
believed the Law of Nations required—the negative—was ultimately de-
feated at the Convention, however. Somehow, in the process of drafting 
the first drafts of the Constitution, a purportedly equivalent judicial power 
to review state laws and violations of the Law of Nations appears, written 
in the hands of Edmund Randolph. Potentially, this is a direct response 
to both men’s conviction that it was not an option to leave Philadelphia 
without a means to prevent states from violating treaties and the Law of 
Nations.  
Madison’s reaction to the failure of the negative further under-
scores its importance, as he left Philadelphia convinced its omission 
threatened the entire Constitution. He had first hinted to Jefferson in Sep-
tember his “opinion . . . that the plan . . . will neither effectually answer its 
national object nor prevent the local mischiefs which every where excite 
disgusts agst [sic] the state governments.”125 Expounding on this point in 
a later, lengthy October T{, Saba letter, Madison argued that the only 
workable solution to “the due partition of power, between the General & 
local Governments, was . . . a check on the States [that] appear[ed] to 
me necessary.”126 Even though it was: 
 
[S]aid that the Judicial authority under our new system will 
keep the States within their proper limits, and supply the 
place of a negative on their laws. The answer is that it is 
more convenient to prevent the passage of a law, than to 
declare it void after it is passed; … a State which would vio-
late the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very 
ready to obey a Judicial decree in support of them, and that 
a recurrence to force, which in the event of disobedience 
 
125 From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 163-65 (Robert A. Rutland, et al., ed., 1977). 
126 10 id. at 205-20. 
34
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol31/iss1/4
A CONSTITUTION FIT FOR A NATION 
243 
would be necessary, is an evil which the new Constitution 
meant to exclude as far as possible.127  
 
Interestingly, the letter notes that it was “said” that an enlarged Judicial 
authority took the place of the negative and would “keep the States within 
their proper limits.” Who said this, and how did it get it into the Constitu-
tion?  
The person who likely introduced this enlarged Judicial authority 
is none other than Edmund Randolph in his capacity as a member of the 
Committee of Detail. It’s hard to prove this conclusively, however, as the 
inner workings of the Committee of Detail were shrouded in secrecy. 
From July Tm, Saba to August m, Saba, the Convention adjourned while the 
Committee of Detail prepared the first draft of the Constitution, working 
from the collection of short resolutions passed to date.128 Analyses of the 
Committee’s work generally consider it to have weakened the central 
government in favor of giving the states more domestic power.129 Some 
go so far as to consider it a “hijacking” of the convention in favor of states’ 
rights, particularly the Deep South’s.130 Recently, however, William Ewald 
revisited the original manuscripts of these drafts to better reconstruct the 
precise sequence of the drafting of these documents and to better iden-
tify their principle authors. Ewald’s work suggests a larger role for Ed-
mund Randolph and the Law of Nations. The Committee of Detail docu-
ment that Farrand labelled “Document IV” is likely the first full draft of the 
Constitution and was written entirely in Randolph’s hand.131 Henceforth 
referred to as “Randolph’s Draft,” it introduced numerous substantive 
provisions into the Constitution. Among its innovations, it provides the 
first complete framework for the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In this 
regard, Ewald argues it is “a clear expansion of the federal judicial power, 
 
127 Id. 
128 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 130-76. 
129 John C. Hueston, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The Role of 
the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers, 100 
Yale L.J. 765, 766 (1990). 
130 DAVID O. STEWARD, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 
163-75 (2007).  
131 William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENT. 197, 220 
(2012). 
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going well beyond what Madison’s Notes relate as having been dis-
cussed in Convention.”132 In other words, the very provisions Madison 
considered to be intended as a replacement for the negative—a feature 
he thought was “absolutely necessary to a perfect system”—appear to 
be have been in some part the work of the like-minded Edmund Ran-
dolph.133 At the same time the states’ domestic powers were expanded, 
there was a novel and notable desire to explicitly grant the Federal gov-
ernment greater power over foreign affairs. This is too extraordinary to 
be a mere coincidence.  
Randolph’s Draft also added specific, well-defined powers to co-
erce states to obey treaties and follow the Law of Nations, the very issue 
Randolph and Madison were so concerned about at the start of the Con-
vention. First, it explicitly gave the Senate the power to “make treaties of 
commerce . . . [and] make treaties of peace or alliance.”134 According to 
Ewald, the “addition of the powers over foreign affairs is new and appears 
to be Randolph’s own interpolation.”135 Another major innovation intro-
duced by Randolph’s Draft was the specific enumeration of the powers 
of the national legislature. Again, many historians see the mere act of 
enumeration as evidence the Committee of Detail meant to weaken the 
central government given that the Convention had resolved for a general 
grant of power.136 Namely, the Convention had resolved the national leg-
islature should have the power: 
 
[T]o legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Un-
ion, and also in those Cases to which the States are sepa-
rately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United 




132 Id. at 236. 
133 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 164. 
134 2 id. at 143-44. 
135 Ewald, supra note 131, at 228 (emphasis added). 
136 See interpretation in Hueston, supra note 129, at 771. 
137 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 131-32. 
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The changes introduced by the Committee of Detail strengthened 
the states’ domestic powers in exchange for inserting greater federal con-
trol over foreign affairs. A careful look at the Committee of Detail’s enu-
meration shows it was consistent with a key element of the Virginia Plan’s 
negative. The provisions in Randolph’s handwriting explicitly granted the 
legislature the power reign in states’ abilities to start conflicts, as only the 
national legislature would have the power “to provide tribunals for of-
fenses against the laws of nations [emphasis added]; . . . to declare the 
law of treason; [and] to regulate the state militias.”138 John Rutledge 
added in the power to regulate Indian affairs and the power to enforce 
treaties.139 This enumeration gives the legislature explicit power to stop 
the states’ interference in foreign affairs. By contrast, it’s not at all clear 
that the Convention’s general grant of the power to legislate in all cases 
“in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted” would 
apply in similar circumstances. The mere fact that Randolph’s Draft 
added these provisions is not sufficient to attribute them purely to Ran-
dolph nor to demonstrate they were added as part of any larger plan. 
Given Randolph’s clear agreement with Madison on the need for coer-
cive power over foreign affairs, however, it strongly suggests that the Vir-
ginians’ understanding of the requirements the Law of Nations imposed 
on the new Constitution was incorporated into the Committee of Detail’s 
work and the final Constitution.  
These new mechanisms to control the states’ incursions into for-
eign affairs required one additional thing, however; the states needed to 
willingly accept the new Constitution rather than pursue an alternative 
such as independence or forming separate Confederations. Certainly, 
Randolph and Madison felt this was the only benign outcome of the Con-
vention. Madison believed that the alternative, disunion, was the most 
dangerous outcome for some time, even more dangerous than a flawed 
Confederation. As early as SabR, he conveyed to Randolph his concern 
that groups of states: 
 
[M]ight be forming other confederacys . . . [and] [u]nless 
some amicable & adequate arrangements be speedily taken 
 
138 Id. at 143-44; Ewald, supra note 131, at 229. 
139 Ewald, supra note 131, at 229. 
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. . . a dissolution of the union will be inevitable. . . . The con-
sequence of such a situation would probably be that at alli-
ances would be soug[h]t first by the weaker and then by the 
stronger party and this country be made subservi[ent] to the 
wars and politics of Europe.”140  
 
Four years later, at the Convention, Madison still believed that 
“the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States.”141 Randolph 
agreed that as “dreadful as the total dissolution of the union” was, he 
“entertain[ed] no less horror at the thought of partial confederacies.”142 
Writing to Virginia’s House of Delegates, he explained that if any states 
refused to join the new government: 
 
Let it not be forgotten, that nations, which can inforce [sic] 
their rights, have large claims against the United States, and 
that the creditor may insist on payment from any one of them 
[emphasis added]. Which of them would probably be the vic-
tim? The most productive and the most exposed.143 
 
In no uncertain terms, he told his fellow Virginians that the changes 
needed in their union “cannot be interwoven in the confederation without 
a change of its very essence; or in other words, that the confederation 
must be thrown aside.” 144 The Virginians clearly recognized the dangers 
of their present situation but saw the emergence of multiple successor 
states to the Confederation as an even greater danger. Why? 
The Law of Nations succinctly describes why the secession of 
individual states or the formation of multiple Confederations would have 
been an even more dangerous path forward; in either case, all of the 
successor states to the Confederation would still be bound by its treaties 
in some capacity yet would lack any shared, political mechanism to en-
sure compliance. Vattel’s The Law of Nations sets out a very clear rule— 
 
140 From James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 25, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 285-88 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal eds. 1969). 
141 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 388. 
142 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
115, at 269. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 267. 
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that the treaty obligations of the Confederation would absolutely pass to 
all its successor states in some form. Even if “changes are made in the 
form of the government . . . the treaty concluded with the nation, remains 
in force as long as the nation exists.”  Where multiple successor states 
emerge from a single state: 
 
[P]ublic treaties . . . are . . . made to subsist independently . 
. . and the obligation imposed on the state passes succes-
sively to all its conductors [emphasis added], in proportion 
as they assume the public authority. It is the same with re-
spect to the rights acquired by these treaties; they are ac-
quired for the state, and successively pass to its conduc-
tors.145  
 
Thus, whatever the outcome in Philadelphia, the states’ obligations re-
mained unchanged. The only way to stop treaty violations, then, was a 
new, stronger government accepted by all the existing members of the 
Confederation. 
If the Committee of Detail, or at least part of its membership, 
agreed with this diagnosis, it certainly would have recognized the over-
riding need to ensure all states would be willing to ratify the Constitution. 
This implication of the Law of Nations offers a novel explanation for one 
of the most enduring mysteries of the Convention, namely why the final 
Constitution appears so pro-Southern. Many scholars have been hard-
pressed to explain this using only domestic issues and the domestic bal-
ance of power. Even the most ardent Southerners believed the South 
depended on the North far more than the other way around.146 Under the 
Law of Nations, however, states that refused to join the new union, par-
ticularly those most prone to violating the Confederation’s treaties, would 
 
145 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 184 (1760). 
146 George Washington, perhaps the pre-eminent American, military expert and a Virgin-
ian, felt, with regards to his own State, that “in point of strength, it is comparatively, weak.” 
From George Washington to Bushrod Washington, (Nov. 9, 1787), in 5 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 420-25 (W. W. Abbot ed. 1997). Likewise, General Pinckney of 
South Carolina, known for his strongly pro-Southern stances, agreed that it was in “the 
interest [of] the weak South[er]n States” to be “united with the strong Eastern States.” 2 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 499.  
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have more bargaining power, not less. Holdout states or states that se-
ceded from a rump Confederation could risk treaty violations for their sole 
benefit while all the other successor states of the Confederation bore the 
liability for the consequences. This strongly suggests that it would have 
been in the interest of the better-behaved states to ensure all states 
would accept the new Constitution, particularly those most likely to en-
croach on foreign affairs. The states most likely to involve the others in a 
war and most vocal about demanding certain nonnegotiable provisions 
in exchange for their membership in the new union were none other than 
those of the Deep South.147 These were the same states Madison and 
Randolph had so feared would trigger a confrontation with Spain since 
SabU, and there was certainly abundant evidence that they or their west-
ern settlers had and would pursue their own interests whatever the con-
sequences to the other states. Could it be that the domestic concessions 
to the Deep South represent the price to ensure it willingly acquiesced to 
the new union and its monopoly over foreign affairs and the Law of Na-
tions? 
Further changes introduced by Randolph’s Draft are consistent 
with this hypothesis. In addition to providing expanded judicial authority 
and enumerated powers over foreign affairs, the draft also added the 
now-infamous domestic concessions to the Deep South. Randolph’s 
Draft is the first time the South’s desired prohibition on export taxes ap-
pears, in Randolph’s handwriting no less. Randolph also added a further 
provision to require a supermajority to pass any navigation acts—a bug-
aboo of the Southern States. Finally, it proposed a complete prohibition 
on banning the importation of slaves; it was Randolph who first wrote “no 
prohibitions on Importations of inhabitants. no duties by way of such pro-
hibition.”148 The fact that these changes were introduced simultaneously 
with provisions to control foreign policy does strongly suggest some con-
nection between them. This is only further bolstered by the connection 
 
147 On July 23, 1787, General Pinckney reminded “the Convention that if [it] . . . should 
fail to insert some security to the Southern States agst. [sic] an emancipation of slaves, 
and taxes on exports, he shd. [sic] be bound by duty to his State to vote agst.” 2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 95. A few weeks later, 
on August 22, John Rutledge echoed Pinckney’s sentiment that, if “the Convention thinks 
that N.C.; S.C. & Georgia will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves 
be untouched, the expectation is vain.” 2 id. at 373. These three States’ strong opinions 
on these subjects has been covered countless times by other scholars. 
148  Ewald, supra note 131, at 232. 
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already demonstrated between the growing crisis on the Southern bor-
der, involving both western settlers and the states of the Deep South, and 
the monopoly over foreign affairs that Madison and Randolph sought for 
the new government. The Committee worked in part from the Virginia 
Plan, whose monopoly over foreign affairs was motivated by the turmoil 
along the Southern borders and the Southerners’ responses to the Mis-
sissippi crisis. It’s a reasonable conclusion that the Committee of Detail’s 
decision to bolster the federal government’s powers over foreign affairs 
shared similar inspirations, namely a concern over the actions of certain 
Southern states. Considering the numerous comments from the South-
ern delegates that they would reject the Constitution unless it provided 
for certain domestic policy protections, it’s plausible these were added to 
ensure that states the Confederation most needed a monopoly over in 
foreign affairs ultimately accepted that monopoly. There’s not enough ev-
idence from the Committee’s work to establish this conclusively, but the 
broader strokes of Madison’s and Randolph’s motivations, combined with 
the simultaneous insertion by Randolph of a foreign affairs monopoly and 
the inducements for the states the Virginians’ most wanted such a mo-
nopoly over, strongly suggest a connection here. If true, these Deep 
South provisions, reviled as everything from “Southern craft and gall” to 
a “hijacking” of the Constitution, are better seen as a calculated bargain 
to enhance the domestic powers of the states—even to the point of grant-
ing certain sectional interests explicit protections—enough to entice uni-
versal assent to the new Constitution and ensure that one or two mem-
bers of the original Confederation could not continue to threaten the 
“whole” with their irresponsible conduct. This compromise may be the 




Were we trying Madison and Randolph for conspiracy to incorpo-
rate their interpretations of the Law of Nations into the Constitution, it 
would be malpractice not to point to Federal Rule of Evidence {Um, which 
states that evidence of a “person’s habit or an organization’s routine prac-
tice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or 
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organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice.”149 
The Law of Nations, aside from providing a clear, consistent motive and 
narrative for Madison’s actions in the years before his rise to fame at the 
Convention, permits us to connect the dots in a pattern of behavior and 
coordination between both Madison and Randolph. It offers a tantalizing 
hint of what exactly happened in the Committee of Detail. 
First, why was James Madison so prepared for the Convention? 
His preparation is legendary but he was not alone in preparing for the 
Convention or even in preparing his own plan of government. Certainly, 
his reputation as a hard-working and brilliant scholar provides some ex-
planation, but some of that reputation, with all due respect to Madison, is 
undermined by circular reasoning. Madison’s reputation for brilliance is 
due in part to his success in Philadelphia and his success is seen as a 
product of his brilliance. Madison’s career prior to Saba, however, when 
viewed in the context of the Law of Nations, is a years-long, determined 
march to find a way to get the states to obey the Law of Nations, an effort 
that directly influenced and shaped the Virginia Plan. Not only does this 
offer a compelling explanation for why Madison was so prepared, but it 
also underscores just how prepared he was. He arrived with the benefit 
of more than five years spent trying and failing to fix the flaws underlying 
the Confederation and was utterly convinced of what needed to be done 
in Philadelphia. The Virginia Plan and “Vices” are both more appropri-
ately seen as the culmination of that struggle, and, in this respect, we can 
say that the Law of Nations is not just relevant to our understanding of 
the Constitution, but that at least some of its principles also formed the 
bedrock of Madison’s constitutional thinking.  
Second, why was Randolph chosen to present the Virginia plan? 
A common explanation is that Randolph was given the job because he 
was the governor and thus the most significant member of the Virginian 
delegation. The Law of Nations again offers a competing explanation. 
Madison, the man whose preparation is legendary, didn’t leave the 
presentation of his plan to chance or mere formality, but instead turned 
to a long-time collaborator and ally in Randolph. No doubt Randolph’s 
position as governor was part of Madison’s calculus, but Randolph was 
perhaps the person most likely to agree with Madison’s prescriptions for 
 
149 Fed R. Evid. 406. 
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the Constitution. Most importantly, Randolph was someone whom Madi-
son knew supported his most cherished provision—a federal negative 
over state laws that violated treaties—precisely because he and Ran-
dolph had already fought for this power.  
Finally, the Law of Nations provides us with the pièce de résis-
tance—a possible new explanation for why the South received so many 
concessions to its domestic interests in the final Constitution. The pattern 
of behavior exhibited by Randolph and Madison—particularly their agree-
ment on the need for the federal power to effectively restrain the states’ 
violations of treaties—suggests a natural compromise that fits the facts 
we do know about the Committee of Detail’s work. Madison supported 
limiting the Confederation’s formal authority to make treaties that it could 
not get the states to obey, as is very evident from his comments during 
the controversy over Jay’s treaty. Also, both Randolph and Madison had 
already tried to give the Confederation the actual power to enforce the 
treaties it did make, as the Law of Nations required. The fact that Ran-
dolph’s Draft, arguably the first full draw of the Constitution, explicitly ex-
panded the federal government’s actual enforcement powers over trea-
ties, foreign affairs and the Law of Nations, in exchange for limiting the 
federal government’s formal authority to encroach on sensitive domestic 
interests—particularly those sacred cows Madison and Randolph might 
expect Southern settlers would almost certainly defend regardless of 
what any treaty said—suggests that the tenets of the Law of Nations, and 
both men’s interpretation of it, played a key role in brokering these now-
infamous concessions to Southern interests. 
Many of our long-held beliefs about our Constitution may be both 
further enriched and, perhaps, overturned by further study of the influ-
ence of the Law of Nations on the actions of the Founders and the com-
promises of the Founding Era. Based on the evidence considered above, 
there is no question that the role of treaties and the tenets of the Law of 
Nations were key to the bargains struck at the Convention. Rather than 
viewing the Law of Nations as a neglected vein of history most significant 
perhaps to questions of international law today, it might be more appro-
priately viewed as a subject that helps explain the very heart of what the 
federal system was intended to do and why the states were able to over-
come their sectional differences in adopting that system. There’s a strong 
argument to be made that an implicit part of the bargain that gave the 
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federal government exclusive control over foreign affairs was that the 
states expected strong limits on the federal power over their domestic 
affairs in return. Madison and Randolph knew from experience that some 
issues were effectively beyond the control of the central government, 
whatever formal authority it might have over the matter. 
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